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Introduction
A LAWYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PURSUING a client’s objectives
while protecting the client’s interests. This duty is fulfilled when the
lawyer, in conjunction with the client, determines the scope of the
representation and then zealously works on the client’s behalf. The
lawyer must require all parties involved to adhere stringently to the
rule of law and any procedural safeguards meant to ensure a fair pro-
cess. The lawyer’s hard work, however, will not protect the client’s in-
terests if the client does not have the economic means necessary to
purchase basic necessities while awaiting the conclusion of the legal
proceedings. Impecunious clients may be forced to accept discounted
settlements—abandoning their right to proceed in court on meritori-
ous claims—simply to be able to eat.
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has recognized in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) the importance of main-
taining client dignity through client participation during the legal
process. The MRPC require client participation in formulating the
means and the objectives of the representation and client-informed
consent in many areas of the representation.1 Yet, MRPC 1.8(e) pro-
hibits lawyers from giving or lending clients money for basic life neces-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. I wish to
thank Professor Larry Dubin for his helpful comments; Amanda Gougeon, my research
assistant, for her hard work; and Jennifer Holzworth for assisting me with the citations.
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2013) (requiring “each af-
fected client give[ ] informed consent, confirmed in writing” before an attorney can re-
present the client if representation creates a conflict of interest); id. R. 1.2 (requiring that
“a lawyer [ ] abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and,
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sities, thereby forcing some clients to suffer while seeking legal
redress.2 The justifications for this rule against humanitarian gifts and
loans do not withstand scrutiny and perpetuate the idea that the ABA
favors corporate lawyers with wealthier clients.
Wealthy clients, such as corporate representatives, generally do
not worry about whether they will have money for shelter or enough
food while awaiting the outcome of litigation. The same is not true for
some injured plaintiffs, especially those who are no longer able to
work because of their injuries. These individuals may not be able to
sustain a decent standard of living during protracted litigation.3 Cer-
tainly, attorneys can help clients obtain any available state, federal, or
other agency aid. Often, however, clients have limited options.4
The case of Cleveland Bar Association v. Mineff5 presents an exam-
ple. George Mineff agreed to represent Mario Cianci who was injured
in an industrial accident.6 Approximately seven weeks after the start of
representation, Mr. Cianci asked Mr. Mineff for money for living ex-
penses.7 Mr. Cianci had already been evicted once. He told Mr. Mineff
that he had only enough money to eat one meal a day and faced evic-
tion again.8 Mr. Mineff recognized that Mr. Cianci was losing weight
and that his clothes were ragged. He wrote Mr. Cianci a check for
$500 and wrote additional checks, over the next several months, total-
ing $5300. There was no agreement or understanding between the
as required by Rule 1.4, [ ] consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued”).
2. Id. R. 1.8(e) (“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a lawyer may advance court
costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the out-
come of the matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”).
3. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 7 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informa
tional_report.authcheckdam.pdf (“Injured plaintiffs are often disabled or at least unable
to work at their previous job, and may lack access to conventional sources of capital, such
as bank loans and credit cards.”).
4. Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our National
Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 743 (1997) (“Even with
increased funding from other sources, such as Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts
(‘IOLTA’), state and local government support, and voluntary and pro bono contribu-
tions, the national Legal Services Program delivery system today is capable of serving only a
small fraction of those in need.”).
5. Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mineff, 652 N.E.2d 968 (Ohio 1995).
6. Id. at 969. Mr. Cianci was not receiving temporary benefits. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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two men regarding repayment of the money.9 At the end of Novem-
ber 1991, Mr. Cianci burst into Mr. Mineff’s office yelling and using
abusive language.10 The employment relationship was severed, but
Mr. Mineff told Mr. Cianci that he did not need to repay the money.11
Mr. Mineff had not previously lent or given money to a client.12 The
disciplinary panel determined Mr. Mineff’s violation of the governing
ethics rule required a public reprimand.13 Two members of the panel
dissented and would have suspended Mr. Mineff from the practice of
law for six months.14
In the majority of states, attorneys like Mr. Mineff, who give or
lend money to a client in dire need, subject themselves to the possibil-
ity of discipline.15 When attorneys are not able to provide financial aid
to their clients, clients can be forced to take desperate measures.
Larry Long’s story was chronicled in the New York Times.16 Mr. Long
suffered a stroke while taking the pain medicine Vioxx.17 To stave off
eviction from his home, Mr. Long borrowed $9150 from Oasis Legal
Finance.18 Oasis is one of many companies that lend money to plain-
tiffs at high interest rates contingent upon a successful outcome of the
lawsuit.19 Within eighteen months of borrowing the money from Oasis
he received his $27,000 payment from the Vioxx settlement; he owed
Oasis $23,588—258% of what he borrowed.20 Mr. Long’s and Mr.
Cianci’s stories are not unique.21 Relaxing the bar that prohibits law-
yers from giving or lending money to clients for basic life necessities
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 969–70.
13. Id. at 970.
14. Id. at 971.
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
16. Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/17lawsuit
.html.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. These companies lend money to plaintiffs at high interest rates. Id. The com-
panies are allowed to charge such high interest rates because repayment is contingent
upon a successful outcome for the plaintiff and thus considered an investment, not a loan.
Id.
20. Id.
21. One need only look to the cases or ethics opinions concerning lawyers’ humanita-
rian loans for other examples. See, e.g., Hanish v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 875 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1994);
Medina Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Kerek, 809 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 2004); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Nus-
baum, 753 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio 2001); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456
(Okla. 2000).
460 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
would allow lawyers, who so choose, to be a fair funding source for
clients in need.
Attorneys should be allowed to provide existing clients financial
assistance for basic life necessities during litigation. When lawyers are
permitted to finance living expenses for existing clients, these clients
are less likely to suffer during the legal representation due to an in-
ability to purchase basic necessities. These humanitarian gifts or loans
would not only preserve client dignity during pursuit of legal redress
but, consequently, would prevent clients from having to either pay an
exorbitant interest rate for a third-party loan or accept a discounted
settlement to have money to sustain themselves. Ensuring equal access
to the judicial system while preserving a client’s dignity and interests
fulfills important aspects of a lawyer’s duties and the legal profession’s
mission.
This Article supports the position to change MRPC 1.8(e) by first
discussing lawyering as a profession and the resultant professional
duty to ensure that the poor not only have equal access to the legal
system but that their dignity is not compromised in the course of pur-
suing their legal rights. Part II discusses the history of MRPC 1.8(e)
and the relevance of maintenance restrictions and the contingency
fee. Part III sets forth the arguments against the current rule and dis-
cusses the impact of third-party litigation financing. Part IV examines
the rules in those few states that have elected to modify MRPC 1.8(e)
and concludes that the majority of these modifications are too restric-
tive. Instead, it is proposed that the ABA and the states amend MRPC
1.8(e) to permit attorneys to provide financial assistance to existing
clients where the conduct satisfies MRPC 1.8(a) and 1.722 and where
the attorney did not solicit clients with a promise of financial assis-
tance for living expenses.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not enter into
a business transaction with a client . . . unless: (1) the transaction and terms on which the
lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) the
client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportu-
nity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and (3) the client
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is repre-
senting the client in the transaction.”); id. R. 1.7 (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. . . . Notwithstanding the exis-
tence of a concurrent conflict of interest . . . a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the
lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client; . . . and (4) each affected client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing.”).
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I. Law as a Profession
Lawyers are members of a profession. “Professional work . . . re-
quires the practitioner to adhere to demanding standards of compe-
tence and public service.”23 William M. Sullivan, in his work for the
Carnegie Foundation, lists the following as fundamental characteris-
tics of a profession:
[S]pecialized training in a field of codified knowledge usually ac-
quired by formal education and apprenticeship, public recognition
of certain autonomy on the part of the community of practitioners
to regulate their own standards of practice, and a commitment to
provide service to the public that goes beyond the economic wel-
fare of the practitioner.24
This commitment to provide service to the public can be seen as a
partnership between the public and the occupation.25
This partnership arises because professions generally provide
“services that are widely demanded among virtually all groups within
the community, thereby reflecting the belief that these services are
crucial to the overall well-being of society.”26 Further, these services,
such as health care and legal representation, require specialized
knowledge.27 The necessity of the service to the public, along with the
specialized nature of the skill needed to deliver the service, then de-
mands that the professionals use their skills to advance the interest of
those they serve and thus creates a partnership with the public.28 The
ABA recognized the partnership in the 1986 Report from the Commission
on Professionalism.29 The Commission adopted the definition of profes-
sion as “refer[ring] to a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common
23. WILLIAM SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSION-
ALISM IN AMERICA 38 (2d ed. 2005).
24. Id. at 36. Professor Richard K. Greenstein, writing in this area, states that there is a
lack of consensus as to what defines a profession. Richard K. Greenstein, Against Profession-
alism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 330 (2009). He would define the necessary elements as:
(1) [T]hat the occupation provides services requiring a high level of specialized skill, in-
cluding intellectual skill; (2) that the occupation provides services that are widely de-
manded among virtually all groups within the community, thereby reflecting the belief that
these services are crucial to the overall well-being of society; and (3) that the privilege of
providing these services is regulated by the state (or a proxy for the state).
Id.
25. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 4.
26. Greenstein, supra note 24, at 330.
27. Id.
28. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 4–5.
29. There can be little doubt that the ABA and members of the bar believe that law-
yers, as professionals, owe a duty to the public. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
preface (1980) (statement of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone) (“Before the Bar can func-
tion at all as a guardian of the public interests committed to its care, there must be ap-
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calling in the spirit of public service – no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in
the spirit of public service is the primary purpose.”30 Thus, a chief duty for a
professional is to “work in such a way that the outcome of the work
contributes to the public value for which the profession stands.”31
There is, however, a “widespread perception that professional in-
tegrity is breaking down or is seriously at risk of doing so.”32 Perhaps
this breakdown is an inevitable result of increased commercialization
in professional fields and the resulting economic pressure on profes-
sionals to maximize profits.33 If the relationship between the profes-
sion and the public will not generate profits, it may be a secondary
consideration.34 Another factor may be the abuse of public trust,
which has been “a discouragingly familiar aspect of professional
history.”35
A source of public dissatisfaction with the legal profession, in par-
ticular, is the belief that participation by lawyers in scandals, such as in
Enron and WorldCom, demonstrates that lawyers are more concerned
with profits than public welfare.36 “[T]he public perception of lawyers
remains overwhelmingly negative . . . .”37 The litigation section of the
ABA conducted a survey in which “69% of those polled agreed that
praisal and comprehension of the new conditions, and the chained relationship of the
lawyer to his clients, to his professional brethren and to the public.”).
30. Ronald C. Minkoff, Reviving a Tradition of Service: Redefining Lawyer Professionalism
in the 21st Century, 19 PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2009, at 1 (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING
OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) [hereinafter IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE], avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Commission_Report.pdf.
31. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 23.
32. Id. at 283. “As if in illustration, the story of the demise of the venerable and long-
trusted auditing firm of Arthur Andersen stands as a sad emblem of professional failure
and its consequences for the general welfare.” Id. at 45. This anxiety suggests that many
people feel socially vulnerable and personally threatened by the loss of professional integ-
rity. See id. It testifies to the importance of professional functions in modern society, even
when professionals hold little power over others. See id.
33. Id. at 23–24 (“Emphasis upon the efficiency of markets, which in practice often
means stimulating competition, threatens essential features of the professional-client
relationship.”).
34. Id. at 44 (“By defining all public activities as self-interested, profit-oriented enter-
prises, this powerful trend works to strip away any moral understanding of the relationship
between profession and society, or between professional and client, except that of com-
mercial exchange.”).
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Minkoff, supra note 30, at 22 (“[I]t has not been helped by recent headlines show-
ing lawyers involved in large Ponzi schemes, frauds on large estates, and other
defalcations.”).
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lawyers are more interested in making money than in serving their
clients.”38 To assuage public dissatisfaction, the ethical codes and legal
regulations that are part of a profession must reflect an institutional
framework that supports the public good.39 “Without [a] willingness
to uphold the contract with society, professional work ceases to be
good, for individual practitioners or for the public.”40
Lawyers and specifically the ABA should promote the profession’s
commitment to the public. Sullivan argues that “professionalism can
be renewed as a positive force” when the professional leadership cre-
ates standards that strengthen the profession’s ties to the public.41
The legal community’s belief in its partnership with the public
and its corresponding professional duties are reflected in the MRPC.
Lawyers are expected to engage in pro bono representation.42 MRPC
6.1 states “[e]very lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide
legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render
at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.”43 Al-
though no state mandates pro bono activity for its practicing attor-
neys,44 the expectation that lawyers will serve those in need is a basic
tenet of the legal profession. The idea is that lawyers should “investi-
gate claims, and give professional aid in redressing the wrongs, of the
indigent who have been injured, for in this way many poor people
would be enabled to obtain justice where, without such an aid, they
would be remediless.”45
This sentiment is echoed in the preamble of the MRPC, which
begins by recognizing that lawyers are members of a profession man-
dating a special responsibility to the public.46 It states:
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law,
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the
quality of service rendered by the legal profession. . . . A lawyer
38. Id. at 3 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7 (2002)).
39. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 24.
40. Id. at 40.
41. Id. at 56; see also COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 7.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2013).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013) (“Every applicant
admitted to the New York State bar on or after January 1, 2015 . . . shall complete at least
50 hours of qualifying pro bono service prior to filing an application for admission with the
appropriate Appellate Division department of the Supreme Court.”).
45. Michael R. Koval, Note, Living Expenses, Litigation Expenses, and Lending Money to
Clients, 7 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1117, 1121 (1994) (citing Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 750
(Ohio 1892)).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. [1].
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should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not
poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance.47
The preamble defines the duties public lawyers assume as members of
the legal profession. These duties include working to improve access
to the legal system;48 using their time, resources, and “civic influence
to ensure equal access to our system of justice for those who because
of economic and social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate le-
gal counsel;”49 and ensuring that bar regulations are in the public
interest.50
These duties provide a mandate for amending MRPC 1.8(e),
which currently limits the poor’s access to the judicial system by bar-
ring lawyers from using their resources to ensure equal access. Law-
yers should be permitted to give or lend money to existing clients in
need of basic necessities during legal representation in order to pre-
vent the client from having to accept a discounted settlement or aban-
doning a meritorious claim. The outright bar in MRPC 1.8(e)
arguably serves defense attorneys’ clients’ interests at the expense of
the poor. Not only does the inability to obtain fair funding limit legal
redress for the poor, but where a defendant only pays a discounted
amount to compensate plaintiffs for the defendant’s wrongful con-
duct, the financial deterrent to prevent the defendant’s future injuri-
ous behavior against other members of the public is reduced.
Members of the legal profession must scrutinize whether the self-regu-
lation rules that they are entrusted to create serve the public interest.
Where such rules limit the poor’s access to the judicial system and
where such rules do—or even are perceived to—favor wealthy clients
at the expense of the poor, then the legal profession has failed to
perform its professional duties to the public.
Equal access to the legal system is an important goal of the legal
profession and the ABA.51 Another equally important responsibility is
47. Id. pmbl. [6].
48. Id. The ABA’s white paper on professionalism also emphasizes the need to “[f]ind
ways to increase access to lawyers and the legal system.” Minkoff, supra note 30, at 26.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. [6].
50. Id. Section 6 of the preamble mentions that bar regulations should benefit the
public. Id. This idea is mentioned again in Section 12, which states, “[t]he legal profes-
sion’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The pro-
fession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest
and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.” Id. pmbl. [12].
51. One objective of the ABA Center for Human Rights’s mission is to “assure mean-
ingful access to justice for all persons.” About Us, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/about_us.html (last visited May 22,
2014); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.; id. R. 6.1; Minkoff, supra note 30.
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ensuring that clients are treated with dignity throughout the legal rep-
resentation. Professor David Luban asserts that the protection of
human dignity lies at the foundation of the lawyer’s work.52 Certain
rules in the MRPC reflect a concern for human dignity by ensuring
that clients are entitled to decide important aspects of their represen-
tation, such as the objectives of the representation,53 what plea to
enter, and whether to settle or testify.54 The burden falls upon lawyers
as fiduciaries to ensure that the ethics rules and other governing rules
are interpreted and followed as to promote their clients’ interests.55
Lawyers as fiduciaries must exercise the utmost loyalty to their clients’
interests.56
Additionally, Martha F. Davis, whose work explores the relation-
ship between human rights and legal ethical rules, has stated “ethical
codes could encourage lawyers to strive for results that accord with
human rights principles . . . .”57 She uses MRPC 1.8(e) as an example
of a failure to consider human rights principles and argues:
 Instead of focusing on potential conflicts of interest and the in-
tegrity of the judicial system, a human rights approach to the ques-
tion of subsidy would acknowledge the inequality . . . that a
meritorious lawsuit might be thwarted if the client cannot subsist
during its pendency. . . . [A] client’s lack of access to subsistence
support (that is, access to economic rights) has a critical impact on
his or her ability to vindicate other procedural or substantive legal
rights. A human rights approach would reformulate this rule . . .
[and] explicitly encourage lawyers to extend subsistence support to
52. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 65–95 (2007).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (“Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and,
as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to
carry out the representation.”).
54. Id. (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.”). Ensuring client dignity in the judicial system is also embodied in the constitu-
tional mandate of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that criminal defendants are enti-
tled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 584 (2009) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000)) (“A lawyer is a
fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person’s affairs are entrusted in circumstances
that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other person to supervise closely the
performance of the fiduciary.”).
56. Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1149 (1999).
57. Martha F. Davis, Human Rights and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Intersection
and Integration, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157, 158 (2010).
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clients when such support would contribute to vindicating impor-
tant human rights.58
Whether viewed through a human rights lens, a professionalism lens,
or as a matter of fiduciary duty, lawyers must advocate for preserving
human dignity during the legal representation. Equal access to the
legal system to vindicate legal rights and the ability to have one’s basic
needs met during the legal representation fundamentally impact dig-
nity and should weigh heavily in a determination as to whether an
outright ban on humanitarian gifts and loans is necessary and whether
it furthers the legal profession’s commitment to the public.
II. History Leading to Rule 1.8(e)
A. Champerty and Maintenance
Although MRPC 1.8(e) can impede access to the legal system for
impecunious clients, the restrictions in Rule 1.8(e) were adopted to
protect the poor by incorporating rules against champerty and main-
tenance. These rules developed to prevent the rich from manipulat-
ing the legal system through involvement in lawsuits in which they
were not parties.59 “Maintenance” was defined in a United States Su-
preme Court dissenting opinion as follows:
[O]fficious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by
maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to
prosecute or defend it . . . . This is an offence against public justice,
as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial
process of the law into an engine of oppression.60
It defined “champerty” as “a species of maintenance, . . . being a bar-
gain with a plaintiff or defendant campum partire, to divide the land or
other matter sued for between them, if they prevail at law; whereupon
58. Id. at 180–81.
59. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting Casserleigh v. Wood, 59 P.
1024, 1026 (Colo. Ct. App. 1900)).
60. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. A.P.C.C. Serv., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 306 n.3 (2008) (Rob-
erts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *134–35 (1769)). Officiousness is defined as “[i]nterference in the affairs of
others without justification under the circumstances.” Officiousness Definition, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009).
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the champertor is to carry on the party’s suit at his own expense.”61
William Blackstone’s Commentaries were cited for these definitions.62
Blackstone further stated “[a] man may however maintain the
suit of his near kinsman, servant or poor neighbor, out of charity and
compassion, with impunity.”63 Thus, in earlier times, some U.S. courts
recognized that lawsuits brought to redress “the wrongs of the indi-
gent . . . [were a] duty of the profession” and were an exception to the
maintenance restrictions.64 Such an exception furthers the intent of
the maintenance restrictions, which is to prevent oppression of those
without power.65 “The historical justifications for prohibiting any form
of maintenance was because the wealthy and powerful would ‘buy up
claims, and, by means of their exalted and influential positions, over-
awe the courts, secure unjust and unmerited judgments, and oppress
those against whom their anger might be directed.’”66 As stated by the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1892, “[i]t was common then for nobles and
other powerful men to take transfers of pretended rights in action,
especially of lands, from persons not in possession, and prosecute
them, to the great oppression of the weak.”67
Given the purpose to stop oppression and a recognized exception
for charitable causes, the rules prohibiting champerty and mainte-
nance should not be applied to prevent an attorney from providing
61. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 554 U.S. at 315 n.3 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at
*135); see also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894, 897 (Okla. 1992)
(Kauger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A champertous agreement is one
in which a person lacking an interest in another’s litigation finances the suit for personal
gain. Champerty is officious intermeddling in litigation in which one has no interest by
assisting its prosecution with the intent to derive compensation from the proceeds of the
suit.”).
62. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 554 U.S. at 315 n.3; see also Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 748–49
(Ohio 1892).
63. BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *135; see also Smolen, 837 P.2d at 897 (Kauger, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“However, it was not considered maintenance
for a rich man to assist a poor man with money or advice in order to enable him to bring or
defend an action, provided the assistance was given out of charity. It was not maintenance
for an attorney to take money for his advice or to expend money for his client, if it was to
be repaid.”).
64. Moore v. Trs. of Campbell Acad., 17 Tenn. 115, 118 (1836); see also Johnson v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 151 N.W. 125, 127 (Minn. 1915) (“It is generally held that a person,
whether an attorney or a layman, who furnishes assistance by money or otherwise to a poor
man to enable him to carry on an action, is not guilty of maintenance.”).
65. James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition of an Interest
and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 229 (2003) (citing
Reece, 31 N.E. at 749).
66. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting Casserleigh v. Wood, 59 P.
1024, 1026 (Colo. Ct. App. 1900)).
67. Reece, 31 N.E. at 749.
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financial assistance to an existing client for humanitarian purposes
during the representation. Such an application “contributes to the
very type of system inequities” the rules were created to fix.68 Plaintiffs
in need are forced to settle prematurely at a discount due to an inabil-
ity to maintain a decent standard of living.69 The poor plaintiff’s ac-
cess to the legal system is curtailed.
Further, Max Radin has argued that if the doctrines were applied
true to their ancient roots, attorneys would be exempt.70 He recog-
nized that today, however, attorneys are not exempt. Instead, defense
lawyers can accuse plaintiffs’ lawyers of champertous conduct.71 He
further argued that the crimes of champerty and maintenance are
largely obsolete,72 but if restrictions on champerty and maintenance
are applied in a modern context, the restrictions should only apply to
prevent evils, such as frivolous litigation and oppressive bargains.73
A recent survey found that twenty-seven out of fifty-one jurisdic-
tions support this position and permit some form of champerty, as
long as the practice is not being used to promote frivolous litigation,
engage in litigation with improper motives, or intermeddle with the
litigation.74 Thus, “a large minority of states have abandoned cham-
perty restrictions. However, the majority of states have retained the
prohibition.”75
68. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1268, 1273–74 (2011).
69. Id. at 1276.
70. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 60, 65 (1935).
In the early common law the attorney was secure from being thought of as a
calumniator merely by being an attorney, because he had a royal writ to justify his
appearance, and the narratores, the serjeants-conteurs, were removed from that clas-
sification, because they were advisers and colleagues of the king’s judges.
Id. at 60.
71. Id. at 66.
72. Id. at 67 (“As crimes, they have become obsolete. Some of them are still found in
our penal codes. But actual prosecution under them is rare in either England or the
United States.”).
73. Id. at 72 (citing Brown v. Bigne´, 28 Pac. 11 (Or. 1891)) (“Champerty is an evil,
because it may increase improper litigation, because as between attorney and client, it may
lead to hard and oppressive bargains, because it encourages solicitation of legal business
and tends to degrade the profession. . . . Surely it would be more rational and sensible to
say that champerty is an evil when, and only when, it leads to these evils. When it does not,
it is not merely unobjectionable, but may actually serve a good purpose, as so many courts
have expressly and quite justifiably found.”).
74. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 11 (citing Anthony J. Sebok, The In-
authentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98–99 (2011)).
75. ETHICS COMM. OF THE COMMERCIAL AND FED. LITIG. SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 11 (2013).
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Some of these states that have revived and retained the cham-
perty restrictions have used the rules as a tool of oppression.
In the middle 1950’s [sic] seven southern states suddenly discov-
ered a need to reinvigorate and extend existing champerty, main-
tenance and solicitation rules. The flurry of legislation came on the
heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion in which five civil rights organizations appeared as amicus cu-
riae. The two events were not unconnected. The action of the
legislatures was a vigorous political response to the success of these
organizations before the courts.76
Certainly, these rules should not be invoked to perpetuate oppression
of the poor and disenfranchised. As stated by the Ohio Supreme
Court:
[I]t would not be wise to carry rules adopted originally for the pur-
pose of preventing the powerful from oppressing the weak, by
groundless suits in the courts, to the extent of hindering the weak
in efforts to avail themselves of lawful remedies against the power-
ful, now that the conditions making the ancient rules necessary
have substantially disappeared, and new conditions arisen, by rea-
son of which it has become the interest of the powerful to embar-
rass and hinder the dependent and weak from obtaining speedy
justice in courts.77
Further, the ABA currently allows attorneys to pay the litigation costs
for indigent clients78 and allows attorney fees and litigation costs to be
paid contingent upon the outcome of the matter.79 These exceptions
to the rules against champerty and maintenance call into question us-
ing the rules as a justification for the current version of MRPC
1.8(e).80
B. The Contingency Fee
Contingency fees, in early times, were often deemed champer-
tous.81 The courts, however, moved to allow contingency fees as a le-
76. Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1287–88 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Comment, The South’s Amended Barratry Laws: An Attempt to End Group Pressure Through the
Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963)).
77. Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 751 (Ohio 1892).
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (2013).
79. Id. R. 1.5(c), 1.8(e)(1).
80. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 229–30.
81. Radin, supra note 70, at 69 (“When the practice first arose of offering a lawyer a
share of the profit of litigation in lieu of his fee, it was clearly champerty—more precisely
‘maintenance by means of champerty’ . . . —because it would have been champerty, if
anybody, lawyer or layman, had acquired such a share in the profits with or without consid-
eration.”); Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 234–35 (1998) (a form of
contingency fees occurred in early cases, but generally courts deemed them champertous);
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gitimate method for both the rich and the poor to have access to
counsel and the legal system.82 Exploring the arguments for and
against contingency fees lays the groundwork for understanding these
same arguments as applied to attorney gifts and loans to clients for
living expenses.
In the United States, some have posited that the shift to legiti-
macy for the contingency fee was, in part, due to the unsettled land
claims of the early 1800s. Litigants, without any other assets besides
the land, could only offer to pay an attorney a percentage of the value
of any land recovered.83 It has also been stated that the burgeoning
forms of rapid transportation, and the negligence that ensued, were
the catalyst for the contingency fee, which aided poor plaintiffs seek-
ing recovery in litigation against rich defendants.84 One scholar con-
cluded that it was many factors, including “the selection of jurists by a
political process resting on an increasingly broad-based franchise, cou-
pled with the pervasive influence of evangelical thought . . . that influ-
enced nineteenth century jurists to sanction contingency fee
contracts.”85 The result was that courts and state legislatures sanc-
tioned contingency fee payments.86
The contingency fee is not without its critics. Contingency fees
are said to facilitate unwarranted litigation.87 In addition, they are
viewed as allowing attorneys to reap “unconscionably large fees” while
also “allowing an excessive shifting of control . . . from litigant to
counsel.”88 Further, it has been argued that the attorney’s large finan-
see also Baskin v. Pass 19 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 1939). But see Kelly v. Kelly, 56 N.W. 637 (Wis.
1893) (holding that the contingent fee agreement would not be champertous if the attor-
ney received a fee contingent on the judgment as long as the attorney did not pay for
litigation expenses).
82. Stephan Landsman, The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 262 (1998). The Supreme Court had endorsed the contingency fee in
1853. Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, Ethics, and Economics of Attorney Contingent
Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 773, 775 (2009–2010) (citing Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S.
415, 420 (1853)).
83. Karsten, supra note 81, at 236.
84. Radin, supra note 70, at 71.
85. Karsten, supra note 81, at 248.
86. Id. at 240.
87. Landsman, supra note 82, at 261; Shajnfeld, supra note 82, at 807 (“Critics of the
contingent fee have for years castigated it as a device by which frivolous and excessive
litigation is promoted.”).
88. Landsman, supra note 82, at 264; Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1293. The unconscion-
ably large fees argument stems from the belief that attorneys charge the client a large
percentage of the recovery even when there is little to no risk involved in obtaining the
recovery for the client. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees,
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 748 (2002) (dispelling seven myths about contingency fees). Profes-
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cial stake in the litigation may compromise the attorney’s indepen-
dent professional judgment and create a conflict with the client.89
There are several arguments for the contingency fee that have
prevailed. First, it increases access to the legal system.90 Litigation
costs and attorney fees can be substantial. If attorneys were not per-
mitted to advance these costs and fees, then the poor would be with-
out the resources needed to pursue their legal rights.91 Even those
with resources might be risk-averse and choose not to seek legal re-
dress if it were not for the ability to pay the attorney’s fee contingent
on the outcome. Second, a contingency fee may reduce frivolous
claims.92 In choosing whether to take a case on a contingency basis,
the attorney will select only those cases that seem meritorious and
likely to result in a judgment or favorable settlement for the plaintiff.
Otherwise, the attorney risks not being reimbursed for her time ex-
pended on the case.93 Third, a contingency fee encourages attorneys
to work efficiently towards the attorney and client’s common interest
of maximizing the result.94 Lastly, it allows adults to contract freely
and to pay the attorney to take the risk of a no damage award.95
The ABA initially fought against the use of the contingency fee
because it sought to protect clients from unjust charges.96 Some be-
lieve that the organization’s position against the contingency fee was
because “the bar was represented in its official utterances by the more
successful members, who represented litigants of means and who had
sor Kritzer points out, however, that even where there is guaranteed recovery the real risks
are “uncertainty about the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty about what [the
lawsuit] will cost, in both effort and expenses, to obtain the recovery; and uncertainty
about how much time will pass before recovery will be obtained.” Id.
89. Kritzer, supra note 88, at 776; Shajnfeld, supra note 82, at 797–99 (discussing po-
tential conflicts of interest regarding settlement offers).
90. Shajnfeld, supra note 82, at 776.
91. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389
(1994).
92. Kritzer, supra note 88, at 754–57.
93. Id.
94. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389; Shajnfeld,
supra note 82, at 776.
95. Shajnfeld, supra note 82, at 776. There are rules that regulate contingency con-
tracts. These standards include any governing ethics rules along with any statutory rules
governing contingency fees. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2013).
96. COMM. ON CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS, AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 567, 579 (1908), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/1908_code.authcheckdam.pdf (“Contingent
fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the Court in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges.”).
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consequently little occasion to enter into contingent fee contracts.”97
The ABA has now sanctioned the contingency fee with certain restric-
tions as evidenced in MRPC 1.5.98 The ABA’s acceptance of the fi-
nancing of attorney fees in MRPC 1.5 led to the allowance of the
financing of litigation expenses in MRPC 1.8(e) as well.
C. MRPC 1.8(e) Formation
Although the arguments supporting contingency fees have al-
lowed attorneys to finance attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses con-
tingent upon recovery, the same arguments advanced against this
practice are still being used to prevent attorneys from financing living
expenses. A line has been drawn in the sand. Attorneys may advance
their fees, advance litigation expenses, and even pay litigation ex-
penses for indigent clients, but may not advance any living expenses
to any client. Rule 1.8(e) currently states:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the re-
payment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the mat-
ter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.99
The arguments against attorneys financing living expenses are found
in the comment to MRPC 1.8(e). It states:
Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings
brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guarantee-
ing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so
would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not other-
wise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great
a financial stake in the litigation.100
The comment further explains the difference between humanita-
rian loans and litigation expenses by stating that “[t]hese dangers do
not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and
litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination
and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these ad-
vances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help
ensure access to the courts.”101 The comment then states “an excep-
tion allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs
and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be re-
97. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 229–30; Radin, supra note 70, at 71.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5.
99. Id. R. 1.8(e).
100. Id. cmt. [10].
101. Id.
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paid is warranted.”102 The authors give no reason as to why such an
exception is warranted. It is perplexing why no explanation is neces-
sary to show that indigent clients need financial assistance for litiga-
tion expenses, yet the equally obvious fact that those same indigent
clients might need financial assistance for living expenses during the
litigation process is not recognized. Instead, the assertion, as quoted
above, is that, unlike the financing of litigation expenses, financing
living expenses is somehow distinguishable from contingency fee fi-
nancing and leads to frivolous litigation and the lawyer having too
great a financial stake in the litigation.103
The financing of living expenses by attorneys was not always seen
as warranting such concern. The early common law allowed attorneys
to lend their clients living expenses. The Ohio Supreme Court noted
in 1892 that “such advances by the attorney in the progress of litiga-
tion were so common that to denounce the practice as improper
would be to condemn the daily acts of the most honorable members
of the profession.”104 Courts generally imposed the requirement that
the client must repay any costs and expenses advanced.105 But the
practice was seen as humanitarian and permitted so these individuals
had access to the court system.106
Subsequently, the ABA adopted Canon 42 as part of the 1908 Fi-
nal Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics (1908 Canons).107
The 1908 Canons were largely based on the professional codes that
were in existence in the states. They focused heavily on Chief Justice
Sharswood’s book, Professional Ethics, and the State of Alabama’s code
of professional ethics, which had been adopted with slight modifica-
tion by eleven other states at that time.108 Canon 42 stated, “[a] lawyer
may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear
the expense of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 750 (Ohio 1892).
105. See Johnson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 151 N.W. 125, 127 (Minn. 1915) (“As before
stated, an agreement to loan the client funds with which to carry on the suit or to maintain
himself during its pendency is not regarded as per se opposed to public policy. It is only
when the attorneys are to ultimately stand the costs, or when the client is indemnified from
liability for them in case of no recovery, that the law declares the arrangement void.”).
106. Koval, supra note 45, at 1121; see also, e.g., Johnson, 151 N.W. at 127; Shapley v.
Bellows, 4 N.H. 347, 355 (1828); Reece, 31 N.E. at 750.
107. COMM. ON CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 96, at 568–69.
108. Id. at 568–70.
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matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement.”109 After the
adoption of Canon 42, many courts continued to follow earlier court
decisions allowing lawyers to lend their clients living expenses subject
to reimbursement.110
The ABA then issued Formal Opinion 288 in 1954,111 clarifying
that Canon 42 was contrary to previous practice, which resulted in
some courts overruling previous decisions.112 In Formal Opinion 288,
an attorney requested an opinion as to whether other personal injury
attorneys who paid substantial sums of money monthly to their clients
during the time the clients’ suits were pending were acting within the
1908 Canon restrictions.113 The attorney stated that sometimes the
sums were enough to cover living expense and sometimes the
amounts were more.114 The committee considered Canon 42 and in-
terpreted the term, “expenses” in that Canon as only including “court
costs, witness fees and expenses resulting from the conduct of the liti-
gation itself, and not expenses unconnected with the litigation, al-
though resulting from the accident.”115 It also referenced Canon 10,
which stated “[a] lawyer should not purchase any interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.”116 Reading its
interpretation of Canon 42 in conjunction with Canon 10, the com-
mittee determined that a lawyer who advances living expenses would
improperly acquire an interest in the subject matter of the litigation
because the expenses would by necessity be reimbursed from any
money the plaintiff received.117 The committee further determined
that the advancement of living expenses would also violate Canon 6,
which prohibited an attorney “from representing conflicting interests,
109. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 42 (1928), available at http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf.
110. See, e.g., People v. McCallum, 173 N.E. 827, 831 (1930) (holding that it is permissi-
ble for an attorney to advance costs and court charges for his client when the understand-
ing is that the same are ultimately to be paid by the client); Johnson, 151 N.W. at 127
(holding that an agreement where an attorney advanced money for expenses and de-
ducted the amount expended from the client’s recovery was not against public policy de-
spite an absence of agreement that the client should not be liable for the expenses in case
of no recovery); In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356 (1924) (finding various agreements between attor-
ney and clients to bring personal injury suit in exchange for living expenses were ethical
and not grounds for disbarment).
111. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 288 (1954).
112. See Mahoning Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Ruffalo, 199 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1964).
113. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 288.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 10 (1908).
117. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 288.
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and imposing upon the lawyer the duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity.”118 Thus, Formal Opinion 288 made clear that the
ABA’s position was that Canon 42 was to be interpreted as barring
attorneys from lending money to clients for living expenses.
In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Conduct
(“Model Code”).119 The Model Code consisted “of three separate but
interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules.”120 The Canons were norms stated in general terms.121 The
Ethical Considerations were aspirational, and the Disciplinary Rules
were mandatory stating the minimum level of ethical conduct.122 DR
5-103(B) of the Model Code codified Formal Opinion 288, further so-
lidifying the ABA’s position. DR 5-103(B) stated:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee finan-
cial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or
guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, ex-
penses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and
costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client re-
mains ultimately liable for such expenses.123
DR 5-103(B) affirmed the ABA’s position on financial assistance to
clients and clarified what constituted litigation expenses, illustrating
that living expenses were not litigation expenses.
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The ABA eliminated with the tripartite format, and instead the MRPC
are Restatement-style disciplinary rules that set forth the minimum level
of ethical conduct. Explanatory comments follow each rule. During
118. Id. The committee recognized that this conflict was not different than the conflict
created by the attorney working for a fee. It stated, however, that such conflict:
[S]hould not be extended to permit the lawyer to acquire an additional stake in
the outcome of the suit which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather
than that of his client, and to accept a settlement which might take care of his
own interest in the verdict but not advance the interest of his client to the maxi-
mum degree. Such an extension would be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity to his client.
Id.
119. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980).
120. Id. Preliminary Statement.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5–8 (1980) (“A financial interest in the
outcome of litigation also results if monetary advances are made by the lawyer to his client.
Although this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it is not
improper to make loans to a client. For example, the advancing or guaranteeing of pay-
ment of the costs and expenses of litigation by a lawyer may be the only way a client can
enforce his cause of action, but the ultimate liability for such costs and expenses must be
that of the client.”).
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the drafting stages of MRPC 1.8(e) in 1979, there was an unofficial
pre-circulation draft that proposed, contrary to the Model Code, that
attorneys be allowed to advance living expenses.124 It stated:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation, except that a lawyer
may advance expenses, including: Alternative (1): Court costs, ex-
penses of investigation, medical and other experts, and obtaining
and presenting evidence. Alternative (2): Court costs, expenses of
litigation, and living expenses.125
Alternative one was the template for the version of MRPC 1.8(e)
adopted in 1983, which is the current version of the rule.
Despite not changing the rule on financing living expenses, there
are several differences between Model Code 5-103(b) and MRPC
1.8(e). Initially, MRPC 1.8(e) does not list what constitutes litigation
expenses. The rationale for eliminating clarity as to what constitutes
litigation expenses is not clear, but the change did not result in law-
yers being allowed to finance client living expenses. Secondly, a lawyer
may pay court costs and litigation expenses for indigent clients, elimi-
nating the responsibility of the indigent client to repay the lawyer for
these expenses.126 Adopting this change furthers the ABA’s commit-
ment to ensuring access to the legal system for those in need. An addi-
tional distinction is that even if the client is not indigent, the lawyer
may finance the client’s litigation expenses with the repayment of
these expenses contingent on the outcome of the matter.127 Conse-
quently, if no money is recovered, the litigation expenses need not be
repaid. Previously, repayment was required in accordance with the
laws restricting champerty and maintenance. This change in the rule
is a move away from adherence to those restrictions in this context.
The ABA’s adoption of MRPC 1.8(e) was then a step furthering the
ABA’s commitment to ensuring equal access to the legal system and
reaffirming the contingency method of payment for attorney fees and
litigation expenses, despite champerty and maintenance restrictions.
Parallel to the ABA’s work creating rules governing lawyers’ con-
duct, the American Law Institute was working on restatements regard-
ing the law governing lawyers. Charles Wolfram, the chief reporter for
the first Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, stated that the Restate-
ment drafters’ focus was different than the ABA’s because the drafters
124. STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS
228–29 (2013).
125. Id.
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (2013).
127. Id. R. 1.8(e)(1).
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would solely consider existing prescriptions relevant to the lawyer’s
duty and would not limit the regulations considered to any particular
legal discipline.128 Despite this different approach, the Restatement’s
current rule is similar to MRPC 1.8(e).129 It states:
A lawyer may not make or guarantee a loan to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation that the lawyer is con-
ducting for the client, except that the lawyer may make or
guarantee a loan covering court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter.130
Comment c sets forth the justifications for this rule:
Lawyer loans to clients are regulated because a loan gives the law-
yer the conflicting role of a creditor and could induce the lawyer to
conduct the litigation so as to protect the lawyer’s interests rather
than the client’s. This danger does not warrant a rule prohibiting a
lawyer from lending a client court costs and litigation expenses
such as ordinary- and expert-witness fees, court-reporter fees, and
investigator fees, whether the duty to repay is absolute or condi-
tioned on the client’s success. Allowing lawyer to advance those ex-
penses is indistinguishable in substance from allowing contingent
fees and has similar justifications, notably enabling poor clients to
assert their rights. Requiring the client to refund such expenses
regardless of success would have a particularly crippling effect on
class actions, where the named plaintiffs often have financial stakes
much smaller than the litigation expenses.
. . . .
Loans for purposes other than financing litigation expense are for-
bidden in most jurisdictions and under this Section. That prohibi-
tion precludes attempts to solicit clients by offering living-expenses
loans or similar financial assistance. A few jurisdictions permit such
payments, limiting them to basic living and similar expenses and
sometimes with the restriction that they not be discussed prior to
the lawyer’s retention. Such permission is usually based on a policy
128. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 199 (1987–1988) (“Where the Kutak Commission attempted to
formulate rules of professional conduct that would be effectively enforced by lawyer disci-
plinary agencies, the restatement will focus both more narrowly and more broadly. More
narrowly, the restatement will concern itself entirely with existing legal prescriptions . . . .
More broadly, the restatement will examine the law affecting legal practice, whether it
finds expression in doctrines of professional discipline, evidence, agency, tort, or
contracts.”).
129. Such a result is not surprising because the majority of states follow the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which means that most courts refer to the MRPC when deciding
cases involving attorney misconduct. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited May 22, 2014) (listing forty-
nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands as adopting the MRPC).
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36(2) (2000).
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of enabling clients to avoid being forced to abandon meritorious
claims or to agree to inadequate settlements.131
The Restatement rule only prevents loans, as opposed to also regulating
gifts as is implied by MRPC 1.8(e), which bans “financial assis-
tance.”132 The comment, however, lumps together “living-expenses
loans or similar financial assistance” in discussing solicitation of cli-
ents, perhaps indicating that there is no distinction.133 Interestingly in
the Reporter’s Notes referencing comment c, the reporters stated that
“[t]he Reporters support the minority position, but that position was
not accepted by the Institute.”134 The Institute chose a rule that re-
flects the current rule in the majority of states, which prohibits attor-
neys from advancing money to clients for living expenses.
Similar to the committee drafting the MRPC, the reporters for
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers proposed a rule
that would allow lawyers to advance living expenses:
[T]he proposed § 48 to the Restatement (Third) Governing Law-
yers . . . restricts advances to clients to circumstances in which a
“loan is needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation
that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or dismiss a
case because of financial hardship rather than on the
merits . . . .”135
Proposed comment d to section 48 would have noted that while loans
to clients beyond litigation expenses are forbidden in most
jurisdictions:
[T]hey are justified when needed to help a financially pressed cli-
ent proceed with a suit rather than accepting whatever settlement
may be offered. A client whose resources may have been depleted
by an injury giving rise to a suit may have difficulty obtaining food,
clothing, shelter and medical treatment during protracted
litigation.136
The proposed section did not win acceptance.
This history demonstrates that prior to the ABA creating the 1908
Canons, the courts recognized an exception to the champerty and
maintenance restrictions and allowed attorneys to advance living ex-
penses to clients in need.137 Although not clear at first, it later became
131. Id. § 36 cmt. c (citation omitted).
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2013).
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36 cmt. c (citation
omitted).
134. Id. at § 36 Reporter’s Note cmt. c.
135. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894, 900 (Okla. 1992) (Kauger, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 906 (Opala, C.J., Hodges, V.C.J., concurring).
137. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
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certain that the ABA’s position was against such an exception.138 The
majority of states have adopted the ABA’s position.139 However, the
history also demonstrates that there is a strong undercurrent of resis-
tance to the ABA’s and the Restatement’s position. To date, this has
only resulted in MRPC 1.8(e) more closely reflecting the ABA’s mis-
sion to provide equal access to the judicial system and evidencing the
ABA’s move away from strict adherence to champerty and mainte-
nance restrictions. This resistance to the current ban on financial as-
sistance for living expenses most likely exists because the justifications
for the ban do not withstand scrutiny. Without valid competing inter-
ests, the policy supporting equal access to the legal system and pro-
moting human dignity should result in elimination of the ban against
attorneys financing client living expenses, as was done for financing
attorney fees and litigation expenses.
III. The Justifications for MRPC 1.8(e) Do Not Withstand
Scrutiny
The heart of the debate over financial assistance to clients for
living expenses involves conflicting ideals: protecting individuals’
equal access to the legal system and dignity during legal representa-
tion versus preventing needless litigation and protecting clients from
lawyers whose financial stake in the litigation might influence their
professional judgment causing their clients harm. Attorneys should be
allowed to advance living expenses for basic necessities because this
humanitarian assistance does not necessarily result in needless litiga-
tion or improper influence making an outright ban unwarranted.
A. Conflicts and Professional Judgment
The relevant comment to MRPC 1.8(e) cites as a justification for
the ban on lawyers financing client living expenses that “such assis-
tance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation.”140 The
concern is that an attorney who lends money to a client for basic ne-
cessities acquires a personal financial stake in the litigation that could
create an impermissible conflict of interest. An attorney who has lent
money to a client contingent on the outcome of the litigation may
advise the client to accept an early settlement, guaranteeing money to
repay the attorney and avoiding the risk of going to trial and receiving
138. See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 226–246 and accompanying text.
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) cmt. [10] (2013).
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no recovery at all.141 Conversely, there is a concern that “[i]f large
sums of money are advanced to maintain the client’s lifestyle, settle-
ment may be frustrated.”142 Settlement may not be possible because
the settlement offer may be too low to allow the client to repay the
attorney. The lending of the money creates a conflict of interest,
which could potentially interfere with the lawyer’s independent pro-
fessional judgment and the client’s best interest.
This conflict, however, is no more severe, and often less severe,
than conflicts created by fee agreements universally recognized as eth-
ical. Such billing arrangements include hourly rates, contingency fees,
and acquiring ownership interest in corporations in lieu of fees. In-
herent in the hourly billing arrangement is the concern that the attor-
ney will not work efficiently because the attorney is being paid based
on hours of work expended.143 This conflict does not even invoke a
conflict analysis under the MRPC.144
The contingency fee billing arrangement creates conflicts similar
to the conflicts created when an attorney lends a client living expenses
contingent on the outcome of the litigation. As described earlier, the
attorney might advise the client to accept a settlement as opposed to
taking a risk of no recovery at trial, or the attorney might advise
against an early settlement holding out for the chance of a much
larger recovery at trial. The difference is that “the magnitude of the
lawyer’s interest attributable to the financial assistance will be far less
than that attributable to the contingent fee contract.”145 Thus, the
conflicts created by the contingency fee agreement are more likely to
influence the lawyer’s professional judgment than conflicts created by
advancing a client living expenses contingent on the outcome of the
litigation. The same point could be made regarding advancing litiga-
tion expenses contingent on the litigation outcome. As with the con-
tingency fee, the amount of money advanced for litigation expenses
can be substantial and may pose a greater risk of interference with the
lawyer’s professional judgment than the lawyer’s advancing living ex-
penses.146 The amount advanced, and the circumstances surrounding
141. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 244.
142. Utah State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 11-02 (2011) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citing In re G.M., 797 So. 2d 931, 935 (Miss. 2001)).
143. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 245.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 246; see also John Sahl, Helping Clients with Living Expenses: “No Good Deed Goes
Unpunished,” 13 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2002, at 1, 5.
146. See Moliterno, supra note 65, at 238 (finding the ABA’s choice to relax the restric-
tion on contingent repayment of litigation expenses in adopting the Model Rules “indi-
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the advance, determines the severity of the conflict. Often, conflicts
created by advancing attorney fees and litigation expenses would be
more likely to affect the lawyer’s professional judgment because the
amount of the advance will be much larger. This fact undermines us-
ing this conflicts justification to ban advancements of client living
expenses.
Further, the conflicts created by attorneys acquiring an owner-
ship interest in a corporate client in lieu of fees would also likely be
more severe than the potential conflicts created by attorneys advanc-
ing living expenses to existing clients.147 In ABA Formal Opinion 00-
418, the committee recognized that this fee arrangement creates con-
flicts and suggested that “[a]t the outset, the lawyer . . . should inform
the client that events following the stock acquisition could create a
conflict between the lawyer’s exercise of her independent professional
judgment as a lawyer on behalf of the corporation and her desire to
protect the value of her stock.”148 The ABA, however, allows this fee
arrangement and gave the following reasons: (1) “to satisfy client
needs;”149 (2) because the attorney investing in the company “is
viewed as a vote of confidence in the enterprise’s prospects;”150 and
(3) because “permitting clients to pay with stock or options creates a
financing device that allows clients broader access to legal services by
providing an alternative currency to pay for those services.”151 These
reasons equally apply to a lawyer advancing living expenses to a client
in need where the advance (1) satisfies the client’s need, (2) may be
viewed as a lawyer’s vote of confidence in the client’s case, and (3)
provides a financing device that may be the only way for a cash-
cated . . . at least an acknowledgment that its dangers are no greater than those already
found in the contingent fee arrangement itself”); id. at 246 (analogizing to a contingent
fee agreement by substituting for the lawyer’s uncompensated time and effort the lawyer’s
money or other assets as raising a negligible difference in the lawyer’s personal interests in
the outcome of the matter).
147. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418, at 10 (2000)
(“For example, the lawyer might have a duty when rendering an opinion on behalf of the
corporation in a venture capital transaction to call upon corporate management to reveal
material adverse financial information that is being withheld, even though the revelation
might cause the venture capital investor to withdraw.”); id. at 2 n.2 (quoting IN THE SPIRIT
OF SERVICE, supra note 30, at 31) (“[The lawyer’s investment] may make the client’s financ-
ing efforts easier, [but] it creates a potential or actual conflict of interest, changing the
lawyer-client relationship in a very fundamental way.”).
148. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418, at 6.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2 n.4 (“Similar to contingent fees, permitting clients to pay with stock or
options creates a financing device that allows clients broader access to legal services by
providing an alternative currency to pay for those services.”).
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strapped client to have full access to the legal system because other-
wise the client may be forced to settle at a discounted rate so as to
have money for needed living expenses.
A fourth justification for allowing a lawyer to accept an ownership
interest in a client corporation in lieu of fees is that a lawyer’s willing-
ness to invest in the company, “[f]requently . . . may be the determin-
ing factor in the client’s selection of a lawyer.”152 As to this fourth
rationale, the fact that a client may select a lawyer based on the law-
yer’s willingness to advance living expenses has been cited as a con-
cern in allowing lawyers to advance living expenses. It has been
asserted that potential clients should choose an attorney based on
qualifications and not on the availability of money.153 Certainly, the
ABA may not see a need to protect sophisticated corporate clients in
the attorney selection process. The result, however, that a corporate
client attorney financing option that creates conflicts is allowed while
an impecunious client attorney financing option is banned seems
wrong when the reasoning is based on the need to protect poor cli-
ents from potential conflicts arising from an attorney who was willing
to lend the client money for groceries.
In light of the ABA condoning these billing practices and con-
doning the financing of litigation expenses, the ban in Rule 1.8(e)
cannot be justified on a conflicts basis. These practices create poten-
tial conflicts of interest often more severe than the potential conflicts
of interest created by attorneys financing clients’ living expenses. In-
stead, the ban in MRPC 1.8(e) should be lifted, and attorneys should
be allowed to lend money to clients for basic necessities, such as food,
transportation, and medical assistance, under the restrictions of Rule
1.8(a) and Rule 1.7. According to Professor Charles Wolfram, where
the client gives informed consent and the advancement of funds or
lawyer time and effort are made “in a way that avoids the possibility of
adverse impact upon a lawyer’s exercise of judgment . . . no sound
reason exists to prevent it.”154
152. Id.
153. Utah State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 11-02 (2011) (citing In re
G.M., 797 So.2d 931, 935 (Miss. 2001)).
154. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-416 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.13
(1986)) (concerning an attorney purchasing a client’s accounts receivable).
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B. Proprietary Interest
An attorney advancing a client living expenses contingent upon
the outcome of the litigation arguably invokes MRPC 1.8(i), which
states:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of
action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a
client, except that the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien authorized by
law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and (2) contract with a
client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.155
Similar to MRPC 1.8(e), this rule is “rooted in the common law
doctrines of maintenance and champerty . . . [and] is intended to
prevent conflicts of interest that might interfere with the lawyer’s exer-
cise of independent professional judgment on the client’s behalf.”156
The arguments disputing that humanitarian loans will always cre-
ate impermissible conflicts157 equally apply to the position that ad-
vancing living expenses will always result in lawyers acquiring an
impermissible proprietary interest in the litigation. Conduct resulting
in an attorney acquiring a proprietary interest in the litigation does
not automatically result in the attorney acquiring an impermissible
proprietary interest.
There are several situations where attorneys acquire a proprietary
interest in the litigation, and the conduct is not banned. For example,
as long as authorized by law, the ABA condones a lawyer obtaining a
contractual security interest in a client’s property to secure payment
of fees earned or to be earned, even if it is a security interest in the
subject matter of the litigation in which the lawyer represents the cli-
ent.158 Where the subject matter of the litigation secures the attor-
ney’s fee, the attorney has a proprietary interest in the litigation.159
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2013).
156. Id. cmt. [16]; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-416.
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-427 (2002)
(“[T]aking possession of client property to secure payment of a fee can be regarded as a
possessory security interest.”).
159. Id. n.13 (listing state bar opinions that find “that the taking of a security interest in
property that is related to or the subject of litigation is a ‘proprietary’ interest”); Radin,
supra note 70, at 71–72 (“To say that [lawyers] have no pecuniary interest in the case,
therefore, is in itself a palpable absurdity. It becomes even more so, when we remember
that in many American states, a lawyer has both a charging and a retaining lien on the
properties, on the monies recovered and on the documents necessary for such recovery.
That is to say, he has a proprietary interest . . . as tangible as any other such interest, in
everything of value that comes out of the particular litigation. There is certainly nothing in
logic or in common sense that denies the existence of the interest because this money
value is not determinable in advance.”).
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Yet, similar to the billable hour billing method being exempt from a
conflicts analysis under the relevant conflict rules, the ABA decided
the lien that secures property that is the subject matter of the litiga-
tion does not even need to meet the fair dealing requirements be-
tween attorneys and clients in MRPC 1.8(a).160
Another example is the ABA condones an attorney purchasing
the client’s accounts receivable and pursuing collection to benefit the
attorney, even if the accounts receivable are the subject matter of the
litigation.161 The attorney must meet the requirements of MRPC
1.8(a), general conflict rules, and must purchase the entire ac-
count.162 Where these requirements are met, the ABA has taken the
position that MRPC 1.8(i) is satisfied, and the attorney is not acquir-
ing an impermissible interest in the litigated matter.163 There is no
question, however, that where the attorney will benefit from the ac-
counts that are a subject matter of the litigation, the attorney’s propri-
etary interest in the litigation creates potential conflicts.164
One more example is that the ABA has decided that lawyers may
post a bond for their clients.165 The ABA allows this practice when the
requirements of MRPC 1.7 are met, despite the conflict that is created
by the “significant risk that this personal interest [in substantial funds
or assets securing a client’s release on bail] will materially limit her
ability to exercise her independent professional judgment on the cli-
ent’s behalf.”166 The ABA did not ban this conduct because it recog-
nized that there may be unusual situations where a conflict will not be
created, such as where the funds posted are negligible.167 As to the
160. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-427.
161. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-416 (2000).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. ABA Op. 00-416 lists conflict possibilities. For example, the committee dis-
cussed the possibility that:
If the lawyer anticipates acquiring an interest in these accounts at a discounted
price, the lawyer may be tempted to pursue the collection action less zealously
than she would otherwise in the hope that the client will then consider selling her
the uncollected debts or that the price of acquiring the debts will be reduced.
Id. Recognizing the potential for additional conflicts, the committee stated that it could
not “over-emphasize the importance of the lawyer’s addressing potential conflicts in her
written disclosure to a client from whom she may purchase accounts receivables.” Id.
165. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004). The
opinion also lists several states that do not allow this practice. Id. at n.4.
166. Id.
167. Id. One reason that might have influenced the committee to stretch to reach this
decision can be found in footnote six, which states that situations where the posting of a
bond would be allowed is where “civil rights lawyers . . . post[ ] bond on behalf of criminal
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possibility that posting a bond is impermissible financial assistance
under Rule 1.8(e), the committee opined that the bond could be seen
as a litigation expense.168
These interests—the lien on property in the litigation, the cli-
ent’s accounts receivable involved in the litigation, and the bond—
create proprietary interests in the litigation. They are allowed when
they conform to governing ethics rules.169 Banning an attorney from
advancing living expenses to an existing client in need because the
attorney acquires a proprietary interest in the litigation is inconsistent
with these practices. Further, in some cases the proprietary interest in
these practices would be larger than the proprietary interest acquired
through advancing living expenses, and thus these situations create
more severe conflicts of interest. Humanitarian loans should not be
banned. Instead, consistent with the ABA committee’s analysis in simi-
lar situations, the approach should be to determine whether the con-
flict creates an impermissible interference with the lawyer’s
professional judgment.
Perhaps, there could be an argument that where humanitarian
loans are allowed some lawyers will lend money beyond what is
needed for basic necessities and line drawing in this context will be
difficult. The ABA committee’s analysis in conflict situations, however,
is often fact specific. Such an analysis should be available to regulate
the advancement of living expenses. For example, in ABA Formal Opin-
ion 00-418, the committee chose not to ban attorneys from acquiring
ownership interest in corporate clients.170 Instead, it gave a factual
example where the conduct would create an impermissible conflict.171
The committee stated, “the stock of the client might be the lawyer’s
major asset so that the failure of the venture capital opportunity could
create a serious financial loss to her. This would disqualify her under
Rule 1.7.”172 Additionally, in ABA Formal Opinion 00-416, the commit-
tee chose not to ban attorneys from purchasing clients’ accounts re-
ceivables that are a subject matter of the litigation. The committee
defendant clients in circumstances where it was likely, or even certain that no one else
would do so.” Id. at n.6.
168. Id. However, the Committee noted that “[g]iven the coercion and duress inherent
in the client’s incarceration, using the promise of securing the client’s release from cus-
tody as an inducement to engage the lawyer would be a violation of Model Rule 7.3(b)(2).”
Id. at n.7.
169. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 00-416, 02-428 (2002),
04-432.
170. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 00-416, 02-428, 04-432.
171. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 00-416, 02-428, 04-432.
172. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 00-416, 02-428, 04-432.
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noted that this situation would lead to potential conflicts, but allowed
the conduct recognizing that it could be done “in a way that avoids
the possibility of adverse impact upon a lawyer’s exercise of judgment
during the course of the representation.”173
The ABA committees, in similar conflict situations, recognized
that the questioned conduct created potential conflicts of interest due
to the proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation but
did not ban the conduct.174 Instead, the ABA determined that for
cases at the margins the analysis could be based on the factual circum-
stances to determine whether an impermissible conflict existed.175 A
similar analysis is possible in regards to lawyers advancing clients living
expenses. The factual determination would involve whether the
money was lent for basic necessities and whether it was done to allow
the client to be able to continue to pursue legal redress. Such a factual
analysis negates the need for an outright ban.
C. Litigation Creation
Another justification for the ban, as stated in the comment to
MRPC 1.8(e), is that if lawyers are allowed to lend clients living ex-
penses, it “would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not
otherwise be brought . . . .”176 This concern does not compel a ban on
humanitarian loans. There are already rules in place to control frivo-
lous litigation. These include doctrines concerning standing and ripe-
ness, ethical rules such as MRPC 3.1 and 3.4, and procedural rules
such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.177 These rules are “bet-
ter designed to prevent or to punish intermeddling and the obstruc-
tion of justice.”178 Further, the current ban on financial assistance for
living expenses “disproportionately prevent[s] the bringing of merito-
rious claims, not frivolous ones.”179 Similar to contingency fee
cases,180 lawyers are less likely to lend money to clients during litiga-
tion of claims with little merit. A lawyer will likely only fund those
cases that the lawyer believes have a chance of success because that
173. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-416 (quoting WOLF-
RAM, supra note 128, § 8.13).
174. See supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000).
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.8(e) cmt. [10] (2013).
177. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 251; Sahl, supra note 145, at 6.
178. Sahl, supra note 145, at 6.
179. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 251.
180. Shajnfeld, supra note 82, at 807–08.
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might be the only realistic way that the lawyer will recover financial
assistance expended.181
The unwarranted litigation argument stems from the profession’s
historical concern about lawyers or other nonparties funding a suit
that would permit a wealthy person to oppress an impecunious ad-
versary in courts or permit an intermeddler to obstruct justice. Liv-
ing expense advances by lawyers today do not oppress poor clients
but instead empower them to prosecute their rights in court.182
Further, a litigant has a right to seek redress through the legal system
as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona in its landmark decision regarding lawyer advertising.183 In
response to the argument that advertising might create needless litiga-
tion, the Court stated, “[a]lthough advertising might increase the use
of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always
better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal
action.”184
The ban in MRPC 1.8(e) cuts too wide. Litigation is not some-
thing to be avoided under all circumstances.185 Frivolous litigation is
unethical and must be avoided. Meritorious litigation, however, pro-
motes justice and punishes wrongful conduct.186 The proper rule
would draw this distinction. An outright ban restricts the meritorious
litigation, along with the frivolous.
D. Obtaining Clients Fairly
Another concern is that a client may choose a lawyer based on
the lawyer’s willingness to lend funds for living expenses instead of
based on the quality of the lawyer’s services.187 As discussed previ-
ously, the ABA viewed the fact that a client might specifically select an
attorney because the attorney was willing to invest in the corporate
client as a reason for allowing an attorney to accept stock in lieu of
fees.188 Perhaps in personal injury situations, however, there is more
of a risk that lawyers may seek to “purchase clients with lucrative
181. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 251; see, e.g., Sahl, supra note 145, at 6.
182. Sahl, supra note 145, at 6.
183. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Utah State Bar Ass’n, Ethics
Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 11-02 (2011).
184. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376.
185. Radin, supra note 70, at 69.
186. Id. at 72.
187. Utah Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 11-02.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 170–175.
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cases,”189 causing other lawyers to be at a competitive disadvantage if
they are without funds to lend.190
Attorneys might even advertise their willingness to lend living ex-
penses as they advertise their ability to take contingency fees and to
finance litigation expenses.191 In comparison to litigation expenses, it
could be argued that advancing living expenses poses more of a risk
that attorneys could “purchase” clients. Living expenses is potentially
a broader category than litigation expenses. Litigation expenses are
tied to the litigation process and arguably are more definitive. Individ-
uals might differ on what expenses would fall within, or outside of, the
category of living expenses. Given these concerns, it is proposed that
attorney financing of living expenses be limited to existing clients. At-
torneys should be prohibited from soliciting clients with the promise
of payment of living expenses. Further, it is proposed that any gift or
loan be only for basic necessities, as a subset of living expenses, where
such aid is necessary to prevent the client from being forced to accept
a settlement. These restrictions should alleviate concerns regarding
the purchase of clients while still fulfilling the goal of providing clients
in need with money or a fair financing option to allow continued ac-
cess to the legal system.
MRPC 1.8(e) should be amended. The justifications for the ban
in MRPC 1.8(e) are not persuasive. An attorney financing a client’s
living expenses should only be prohibited in those circumstances
where it creates an impermissible conflict of interest. Whether an im-
permissible conflict is created should be judged under the existing
conflicts rules on a fact-specific basis, as is regularly done for other
conduct that creates potential conflicts. Where the advancement of
living expenses to an existing client is for basic necessities and meets
Rule 1.8(a) and other conflict rule requirements, many potential con-
flicts will likely not affect the lawyer’s independent professional judg-
ment as much as other practices currently condoned by the ABA.
Lifting the ban is further warranted because it would protect the im-
portant countervailing interests of equal access to the legal system and
the protection of human dignity during legal representation.
189. Utah State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 11-02 (citing GEOFFREY
HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 12.12 (3d ed. 2011)).
190. Sahl, supra note 145, at 5.
191. Moliterno, supra note 65, at 253–54 (advocating both for allowing attorneys to
lend clients living expenses and to advertise this fact); Sahl, supra note 145, at 6.
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IV. The Impact of Third-Party Litigation Funding
A. Consumer Legal Funding
Another reason that attorneys, as members of the legal profes-
sion, should advocate for the removal of the ban in MRPC 1.8(e) is
that the current rule opens the door for entities that some have
termed “legal loan sharks.”192 Certainly, lawyers can explore options
for state, federal, or other organization aid for clients in need.193
Where such aid is not available, clients may experience “litigation fa-
tigue.”194 As explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court:
 If an impoverished person is unable to secure subsistence from
some source during disability, he may be deprived of the only ef-
fective means by which he can wait out the necessary delays that
result from litigation to enforce his course of action. He may for
reasons of economic necessity and physical need, be forced to set-
tle his claim for an inadequate amount.195
To avoid having to settle, some clients in need turn to companies that
supply nonrecourse loans to plaintiffs with pending legal claims.
These companies advertise the ease and convenience of these
loans.196 A former employee of such a company told the New York
Times that in 2007 he answered fifty to sixty calls each day from either
plaintiffs or their lawyers.197 This consumer legal funding industry is
largely unregulated. The loans provided fall outside of regular bank-
ing regulations because the payments are contingent on a recovery.198
Thus, these companies can charge much higher interest rates than
other regulated financial institutions.
This financing “presents several problems, namely the unequal
bargaining position of the customer and the financing firm, the finan-
cial duress prompting the customer to sign a loan agreement, the usu-
rious profit by the financing firm, and the ethical pressures placed on
192. Appelbaum, supra note 17.
193. Sahl, supra note 145, at 5.
194. Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1301 (citing Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (1994))
(“This diminished ability to fully participate in society comes in addition to the familiar
problem of lack of funding and so-called litigation fatigue—depleted monetary and emo-
tional resources needed to pursue lengthy litigation—which leads one-shotters to settle
meritorious cases at a discount or to refrain from bringing them altogether.”).
195. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 446 (La. 1976).
196. Appelbaum, supra note 17.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the attorney-client relationship.”199 It has been asserted that this con-
sumer financing industry has arisen due to the broad ban preventing
lawyers from lending money to clients for living expenses.200 As an
example, an attorney faced disciplinary charges for providing a cli-
ent’s child used clothing and persuading the law firm to issue one
check in the amount of $200 for his client’s basic necessities.201 Al-
though he was ultimately not disciplined,202 such charges evidence
that there is no recognized de minimis exception to the financial assis-
tance ban in MRPC 1.8(e). Further, these charges seem peculiar when
lawyers’ and law firms’ holiday gifts to corporate clients raise no such
concerns. The argument that the corporate client does not need gifts
and thus, it is not “financial assistance” seems irrelevant. These gifts
are given in appreciation for the corporate client’s business and to
generate future legal business.
The scrutiny of the ban in MRPC 1.8(e) is thus not only war-
ranted by the troubling double standard that allows corporate clien-
tele gifts but prohibits needy client gifts, again evidencing a wealthy
client bias, but also because the ban effectively propels the needy cli-
ent to use these “legal loan sharks.”203 When a client’s only choice is
between securing a loan with a high interest rate from a legal loan
shark or securing a loan or gift from the client’s attorney, the client
could rightly question the state bar’s assertion that the ban in MRPC
1.8(e) protects the client’s interests.
B. Large Litigation Funding
Related to, yet different from, the loans mentioned in the previ-
ous Part, plaintiffs and their lawyers could obtain third-party funding
for large complex cases.204 In such cases, finance companies will nor-
mally fund a sizable portion of the litigation.205 This practice has
199. Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Liti-
gation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 357 (2011).
200. Id. at 358.
201. Florida Bar v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1995).
202. Id. at 1192.
203. See Morpurgo, supra note 199, at 358.
204. The financing can be between the plaintiff, usually a corporation, and an invest-
ment company, with the investment company securing the financing with the proceeds
from the plaintiff/corporation’s potential recovery; or the financing can be between the
law firm and the financing company with the loan being secured by law firm fixtures and/
or accounts receivables; or the financing could be secured by the attorney’s portion of the
litigation proceeds. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 8.
205. Id. at 6; Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia:
How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 687–88 (2011) (“These
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gained momentum in the United States.206 In its white paper on alter-
native litigation finance, the American Bar Association Commission
on Ethics 20/20 did not report that the ABA was considering a ban on
third-party litigation funding,207 and the practice is allowed in some
states.208 Additionally, such funding is permissible in other countries,
such as Australia, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom.209 The
willingness of these countries to abolish maintenance restrictions
“have created a global environment in which some jurisdictions en-
able litigants, including multinational litigants, who can comparison
shop among international law firms to make use of litigation fi-
nance.”210 If these trends continue, it seems inevitable that this type of
funding will continue to be available to United States litigants.211
companies advance money to plaintiffs and attorneys to cover personal and legal expenses
while pursuing litigation.”).
206. See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 39 (concluding that there is a de-
mand for alternative litigation funding).
207. See id. at 2–3. The Working Group on Alternative Litigation Finance was directed
to study the impact of alternative litigation finance on the professional responsibility of
lawyers. Id. at 2. The Working Group stated within the paper that it did not consider social
policy, normative issues, legislative response, or regulatory response. Id. However, the im-
plication is that the ABA will not be recommending a ban on alternative litigation funding.
For example, the Working Group commented that a theme of the paper is that “it is diffi-
cult to generalize about the ethical issues for lawyers associated with alternative litigation
finance across the many differences in transaction terms, market conditions, relative bar-
gaining power of the parties to the transactions, and type of legal services being financed.”
Id. at 3. It then concluded that “[r]egulation that maybe appropriate for products in a
sector of the market . . . might be inappropriate in a different segment of the market . . . .”
Id.
208. Dietsch, supra note 205, at 693–94 (listing Massachusetts, South Carolina, New
Jersey, and Arizona as such states).
209. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 2; see also Dietsch, supra note 205, at
687.
210. Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1282.
211. While there are clearly those that oppose corporate and institutional third-party
litigation funding (“TPLF”), this form of litigation financing is becoming an increasingly
popular way to finance a lawsuit in the United States. Indeed, most states have already had
to affirmatively address the issue that TPLF presents as it is becoming a common way to pay
for commercial lawsuits. COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIG. SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT
ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 14–15 (2013), available
at http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=25665; COMM’N ON ETHICS
20/20, supra note 3, at 1–2 (“[Alternative litigation finance] activities have become increas-
ingly prominent in recent years, leading to significant attention in the legal and popular
press, scrutiny by state bar ethics committees, and scholarly commentary. The continuing
globalization of the market for legal services makes alternative litigation finance available
to clients in markets such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and Spain, where it
is legally permitted and generally available.”).
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This type of litigation financing involves nonrecourse loans,212
but the money is advanced “in exchange for a share of the proceeds of
the judgment on, or settlement of, the financed claim.”213 The Ethics
20/20 Commission’s white paper on this issue discussed the myriad of
possible ethical conflicts and dilemmas created by this type of third-
party litigation funding.214 It gave four possible scenarios that could
arise and discussed the potential ethical issues, such as the threat of
conflicts of interest, the threat to the lawyer’s independent profes-
sional judgment, and the implications of the ban on financial assis-
tance.215 For example, the Ethics 20/20 Commission acknowledged:
It is a significant open question whether [a client’s irrevocable au-
thorization to the alternative litigation funding supplier to approve
or reject a settlement offer] is such a significant limitation on the
lawyer’s representation of the client—because it interferes with the
lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment—that the
lawyer must withdraw from the representation of a client who has
agreed to such a contract provision.216
This ethical concern is significant because it arguably prevents any
lawyer from being able to ethically represent a client in these circum-
stances, and it is just one of many ethical concerns associated with
third-party litigation funding.217
Despite numerous and serious ethical concerns, the implication
of the white paper is that the demand for, and availability of, these
services makes third-party litigation financing a current alternative,
and attorneys will need to carefully traverse the ethical minefield it
presents. The commission concluded:
Lawyers must adhere to principles of professional independence,
candor, competence, undivided loyalty, and confidentiality when
representing clients in connection with [alternative litigation fund-
ing] transactions. In the event that the lawyer’s involvement in the
funding process significantly limits the lawyer’s capacity to carry
212. See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 5–6.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id. at 13–39.
215. Id. at 13–38. As to the latter, the paper states that Rules 1.8(e) and 1.8(i) may be
implicated “[w]hen lawyers themselves become the suppliers, except through the estab-
lished mechanism of contingency fee financing . . . .” Id. at 20.
216. Id. at 27.
217. An Australian court stated numerous concerns, recognizing that the funders can
solicit potential plaintiffs, conduct advertising campaigns, and charge unreasonable fees.
Further, where the court does not know about the funders or the funders’ activities, a
court does not have the ability to monitor and swiftly react to inappropriate funder behav-
ior that may result in an abuse of process. Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1288–89 (citing Camp-
bell’s Cash & Carry Pty. v Fostif Pty. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 487 (Austl.) (Callahan & Hydon,
JJ, concurring)).
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out these professional obligations, the lawyer must fully disclose
the nature of this limitation, explain the risks and benefits of the
proposed course of action, and obtain the client’s informed
consent.218
Given the significant ethical risks associated with third-party litigation
funding and the lack of any movement by the ABA to ban it, the
ABA’s ban on attorney’s financing client living expenses makes little
sense. Where third-party litigation funding is allowed, a plaintiff can
contract with a third-party litigation finance company to finance attor-
ney fees, litigation expenses, and living expenses. The third-party liti-
gation funding company is not governed by MRPC 1.8(e) and
consequently may finance the plaintiff’s living expenses. Restricting
the attorney, acting alone, from financing the plaintiff’s living ex-
penses while allowing the plaintiff to contract with a third party to
finance those same living expenses may be detrimental to the client.
Regardless of the type of third-party litigation financing, an attorney
might be able to offer financing that costs the client less. If the attor-
ney were allowed to advance the client living expenses, the attorney
might decide not to charge the client interest. Even if the attorney
chose to charge interest, under this paper’s proposal that MRPC
1.8(a) govern these attorney humanitarian loans, the transaction must
be fair and reasonable to the client.219 The attorney would be re-
quired to charge a reasonable, non-usurious interest rate and the
other safeguards within Rule 1.8(a) would also be implicated.220
Yet, when a third-party litigation finance company is contracted,
this alternative source of funding comes at a cost. As to the consumer
litigation lending companies, the New York Times reported that clients
were charged as high as 99 percent interest in the first year.221 The
ABA white paper reported that “ALF [alternative litigation funding]
suppliers . . . assert that they are making an investment or purchasing
a share of a claim, not making a loan,”222 and thus not triggering
usury rules. Further, as to the large-litigation funding, “[a] typical con-
tingency fee would be between twenty and fifty percent of the dam-
ages, with a cap of three to four times the legal costs advanced by the
funder.”223 State bars that have addressed the issue have allowed attor-
neys to pass through interest paid to finance companies to finance the
218. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 39.
219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(1) (2013).
220. Id.
221. Appelbaum, supra note 17, at 3.
222. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 3, at 12.
223. Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1276.
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litigation as a litigation expense.224 Thus, this financing is expensive
for clients, and the ban on attorney financing of living expenses limits
the competition that might otherwise reduce this cost.
The arguments for third-party litigation funding focus on “in-
creased access to justice” and the leveling of the resources available
between individual litigants and other categories of litigants,225 such
as corporate clients. The benefits extolled in support of litigation
funding apply equally to humanitarian loans by attorneys. Allowing
attorneys to provide a fair source of funding would create additional
competition for these firms and provide another funding option for
needy plaintiffs.
V. State Modifications to MRPC 1.8(e)
Despite the inapplicability of the champerty and maintenance re-
strictions and the unsupported justifications for the ban on attorney
gifts and loans to clients for basic necessities, the vast majority of states
have adopted unchanged MRPC 1.8(e). Of those states that have mod-
ified the ABA rule, some allow for financing of living expenses only
under highly-restrictive conditions. There are only six jurisdictions
that can truly be categorized as allowing attorneys to lend living
expenses.
A. Highly Restrictive Modification
There are several states that allow financial assistance for client
living expenses under restrictive conditions. Initially, New Jersey’s pro-
fessional conduct rules allow only nonprofit organizations to provide
financial assistace to pro bono clients.226 Under the California Rules of
Professional Conduct, a lawyer is prohibited from paying the personal or
business expenses of a client, except the attorney may, with client con-
sent, pay such expenses to third persons from funds collected for the
client or pay such expenses after the representation has ended.227 The
224. Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics: Paying Inter-
est, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 7 (2013).
225. See Steinitz, supra note 68, at 1326.
226. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2002), available at http://www
.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/apprpc.htm#x1dot8 (“[A] non-profit organization authorized
under R. 1:21-1(e) may provide financial assistance to indigent clients whom it is represent-
ing without fee.”).
227. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-210(A)(1) (1992), available at http://rules
.calbar.ca.gov/Rules/RulesofProfessionalConduct/CurrentRules.aspx. California has pro-
posed rules that include Rule 1.8.5, which would allow the payment of personal and busi-
ness expenses of a client “after the lawyer is retained by the client” and where the client
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professional conduct rules in Mississippi and Alabama require finan-
cial emergencies.228 Mississippi’s rule would allow an attorney to pro-
vide financial assistance to existing clients but restricts the financial
assistance to $1500 in any one matter for “reasonable and necessary
living expenses incurred . . . under dire and necessitous circum-
stance[s] . . . .”229 This assistance must be repaid upon successful con-
clusion of the matter.230 The attorney must report such loans to the
Mississippi bar and can apply to the Mississippi bar to lend more
money.231 Further, the attorney must have inquired into the client’s
circumstances and cannot advertise promises of such payments.232 Al-
abama’s rule, although less detailed, states that a lawyer may provide
emergency financial assistance to clients only in the “narrowest and
most compelling of circumstances,” which does not include “the regu-
lar provision of income or support.”233 It also requires repayment of
the financial assistance and prohibits a lawyer from making a promise
of such financial assistance prior to the lawyer’s employment.234 Utah
has adopted the MRPC 1.8(e) language and relevant comment. Utah,
however, added a comment that expands the rule and allows financial
aid to indigent clients for living expenses. It states:
Relative to the ABA Model Rule, Utah Rule 1.8(e)(2) broadens the
scope of direct support that a lawyer may provide to indigent cli-
ents to cover minor expenses reasonably connected to the litiga-
tion. This would include, for example, financial assistance in
providing transportation, communications or lodging that would
promises in writing to repay the loan. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8.5(a)(1)–(2)
(Proposed Official Draft 2010). The transaction would then need to meet the require-
ments of Proposed Rule 1.8.1, which is similar to Rule 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Id. R. 1.8.1, 1.8.5 cmt. 2.
228. MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2)(b) (1999), available at http://courts
.ms.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/rules_of_professional_conduct.pdf; ALA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2008), available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/cond
1_8.pdf.
229. MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2)(b), available at http://courts.ms
.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/rules_of_professional_conduct.pdf (“[S]uch payments . . . can-
not include a promise of future payments, and counsel cannot promise any such payments
in any type of communication to the public, and such funds may only be advanced after
due diligence and inquiry into the circumstances of the client.”).
230. Id.
231. An attorney may petition the Standing Committee on Ethics of the Mississippi Bar
by ex parte application for approval of more money. Id. cmt. ¶ 2. Further, the attorney
“must exercise due diligence to determine whether such party has received any such pay-
ments from another attorney during the continuation of the same litigation . . . .” Id.
232. Id.
233. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) cmt. ¶ 5 (2008), available at http://
judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/cond1_8.pdf.
234. Id.
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be required or desirable to assist the indigent client in the course
of the litigation.235
These rules allow attorneys to offer limited financing for financial
emergencies, often with restrictive conditions such as “dire and neces-
sitous circumstance[s]”236 or the “narrowest and most compelling of
circumstances.”237
B. Moderately Restrictive Modifications
Rules in other states that allow attorneys to help clients with living
expenses can be categorized as imposing more moderate restrictions.
These restrictions include that the attorney not have solicited the cli-
ent with a promise of a loan, that the client ultimately remain respon-
sible for repayment of the loan, or that the loan be necessary to
prevent the client from settling prematurely.238 Minnesota, North Da-
kota, and Montana’s rules contain all of these restrictions and further
only allow the attorney to guarantee a loan on a client’s behalf.239
The Louisiana rule is not limited to only guaranteeing loans and
does not discuss the requirement for client repayment.240 It, however,
235. UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(e) cmt. [10a], available at http://www.ut
courts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch13/1_8.htm.
236. MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2)(b), available at http://courts.ms
.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/rules_of_professional_conduct.pdf.
237. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) cmt. ¶ 5, available at http://judicial
.alabama.gov/library/rules/cond1_8.pdf.
238. Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e)(3) states:
[A] lawyer may guarantee a loan reasonably needed to enable the client to with-
stand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial pressure on the cli-
ent to settle a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits,
provided the client remains ultimately liable for repayment of the loan without
regard to the outcome of the litigation and, further provided, that no promise of
such financial assistance was made to the client by the lawyer, or by another in the
lawyer’s behalf, prior to the employment of that lawyer by that client.
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2011), available at http://lprb.mncourts
.gov/rules/Documents/MN%20Rules%20of%20Professional%20Conduct.pdf. North Da-
kota’s rule is identical. N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2009), available at
http://www.ndcourts.gov/rules/conduct/frameset.htm. Montana’s rule is almost identical
except that it states that the “lawyer may, for the sole purpose of providing basic living
expenses” guarantee a loan and that the guarantee of the loan must be from “a regulated
financial institution whose usual business involves making loans . . . .” MONT. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2011), available at http://www.montanabar.org/associa
tions/7121/files/rpc.pdf.
239. MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3); MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.8; N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3).
240. LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(4) (2011), available at http://www. http:/
/ladb.org/Material/Publication/2011-10-30%20ROPC.pdf (“In addition to costs of court
and expenses of litigation, a lawyer may provide financial assistance to a client who is in
necessitous circumstances, subject however to the following restrictions.”).
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contains the other restrictions mentioned and adds additional restric-
tions that are similar to the requirements of MRPC 1.8(a) mandating
fair dealing in business transactions with clients.241 It further includes
specific rules regarding when charging interest is allowable.242
Texas has a lenient rule that allows living expenses to be ad-
vanced.243 The only requirements under the rule are that it be an ad-
vance or a guarantee for reasonably necessary medical and living
expenses.244 The advance may be contingent on the outcome of the
litigation.245 The District of Columbia’s rule is also lenient in that it
allows the lawyer to provide financial assistance for living expenses
restricted only by a requirement that they be necessary and minimum
living expenses and that they be necessary for the client to maintain
the litigation.246
Thus, several jurisdictions recognize that attorneys should be al-
lowed to give or lend money to clients in need. There is no consensus,
however, as to how to accomplish this objective. Interestingly, in a few
states that follow the MRPC 1.8(e), disciplinary agencies sometimes
avoid the ban by allowing gifts. For example, in Arizona, although the
disciplinary agency stated that an attorney could not lend money for
needed car repairs247 or guarantee a loan for a client,248 a lawyer
could give a client money for things, such as needed medical care,
241. Id. (“[A] lawyer may provide financial assistance to a client who is in necessitous
circumstances . . . .”). The restrictions on such assistance include the requirement of rea-
sonable inquiry that the cause would not be able to be maintained, that the assistances not
exceed the minimum sum necessary to meet the client’s needs, and that the promise of
assistance cannot have induced or come before the hiring of the lawyer or be advertised.
Id. R. 1.8(e)(4)(i)–(iv).
242. Id. R. 1.8(e)(5)(i)–(v).
243. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d)(1) (2005), available at
http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Help
line&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=96.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d) (2006), available at http://www.dcbar
.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/amended-rules/rule1-08.cfm; id. R. 1.8 cmt [9] (“Thus,
under Rule 1.8(d), a lawyer may pay medical or living expenses of a client to the extent
necessary to permit the client to continue the litigation. The payment of these additional
expenses is limited to those strictly necessary to sustain the client during the litigation,
such as medical expenses and minimum living expenses.”).
247. Ariz. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 95-01 (1995).
248. Ariz. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 91-19 (1991).
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where there is no expectation of repayment.249 In Virginia, de
minimis gifts250 have been allowed.
Conclusion
To streamline the various states’ rules, the ABA and the states
should amend MRPC 1.8(e) to allow attorneys to give or lend money
for basic necessities to existing clients to prevent them from having to
settle their cases for a discounted amount or seek assistance from so-
called litigation loan sharks. Living expenses should be treated simi-
larly to litigation expenses under MRPC 1.8(e) in that repayment can
be contingent on recovery in the litigation and be paid by the attorney
for indigent clients.251 Different from litigation expenses, however,
advances for living expenses should be governed by MRPC 1.8(a).
These proposed rule changes balance the competing concerns
regarding attorney aid for client living expenses. First, lifting the ban
on humanitarian loans and gifts advances the legal profession’s mis-
sion to ensure that needy clients’ dignity is preserved during legal rep-
resentation and those clients have equal access to the judicial system.
Second, to address the concern that such loans create an impermissi-
ble conflict of interest affecting the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment, permissible loans should be limited to those for basic ne-
cessities to prevent clients from being forced to accept a settlement
offer. Such loans would be subject to governing ethics rules, such as
MRPC 1.8(a). Further, loans and gifts should be limited to existing
clients to prevent individuals from selecting an attorney based solely
on whether that attorney will fund living expenses. The idea is to cur-
tail the possibility that clients select the attorney who offers to pay the
most but to still allow attorneys to provide a fair source of financing.
Unlike third-party lender financing, when humanitarian loans must
meet MRPC 1.8(a) standards, as is required for attorney client loans
outside of the litigation context, clients’ interests are protected.252
These proposed changes could be effectuated by amending
MRPC 1.8(e) to add a third section that would state: (3) A lawyer may
give or advance money for basic necessities to enable an existing client
249. Ariz. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 91-14 (1991); see also Okla. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 326
(2009) (allowing nominal monetary gifts by public defender to death row inmate).
250. Va. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 1830 (2006).
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (e)(1)–(2) (2013).
252. Id. R. 1.8(a) cmt. [1] (“The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even
when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as
when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated
expenses and offers to make a loan to the client.”).
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to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial
pressure on the client to settle a case because of financial hardship
rather than on the merits.253 The repayment of an advance may be
contingent on the outcome of the matter, but financial assistance may
not be promised prior to the start of the lawyer client relationship.
Comment 10 to MRPC 1.8 would need to be amended to delete the
information concerning the prohibition of such loans. Information
could be inserted that the purpose of the rule is to prevent needy
clients from being forced to choose between accepting a discounted
settlement offer, pursuing expensive third-party financing, or pursu-
ing legal redress without basic necessities. It could emphasize that
loans and gifts are permissible so long as no promise of financial assis-
tance was made to the client by the lawyer, or by another on the law-
yer’s behalf, prior to the employment of the lawyer by the client.254 It
could include a specific prohibition on attorneys advertising that they
provide gifts or loans for living expenses. Further, the comment could
state that similar to attorney client loans outside of the litigation con-
text, loans for living expenses during litigation are also subject to
MRPC 1.8(a).
Where lawyers are allowed to financing living expenses for ex-
isting clients, those clients are less likely to suffer during the legal rep-
resentation due to an inability to purchase basic necessities. These
humanitarian gifts or loans would not only preserve the clients’ dig-
nity during the representation, but consequently would prevent the
clients from having to either procure expensive third-party funding or
accept a discounted settlement to have money to sustain themselves.
Ensuring equal access to the judicial system and preserving client dig-
nity fulfills an important aspect of lawyers’ duties and the legal profes-
sion’s mission.
253. See, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2011).
254. See, e.g., id.
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